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Abstract The recent literature on the epistemology of disagreement focuses on the
rational response question: how are you rationally required to respond to a doxastic
disagreement with someone, especially with someone you take to be your epistemic
peer? A doxastic disagreement with someone also confronts you with a slightly
different question. This question, call it the epistemic trust question, is: how much
should you trust our own epistemic faculties relative to the epistemic faculties of
others? Answering the epistemic trust question is important for the epistemology of
disagreement because it sheds light on the rational response question. My main aim
in this paper is to argue—against recent attempts to show otherwise—that epistemic
self-trust does not provide a reason for remaining steadfast in doxastic disagree-
ments with others.
1 Introduction
How much weight should you give to the beliefs of others, especially to the beliefs
of those who disagree with you? It may often be tempting to ignore the beliefs of
others and remain steadfast in response to disagreements. But would such an
attitude be justified? Or would it be more rational for you to take the beliefs of
others into account, including the beliefs of those who disagree with you?
The recent literature on the epistemology of disagreement engages with this
important issue in our everyday epistemic lives, albeit with a somewhat narrower
focus. The key question in this literature tends to be: how are you rationally required
to respond to a doxastic disagreement with someone you take to be your epistemic
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peer, i.e. with someone who has access to the same evidence and who you expect to
be as reliable as yourself in judging that evidence? Conformists argue that you are
rationally required to reduce confidence in your original belief and perhaps even to
suspend belief altogether.1 Non-conformists tend to focus on epistemic reasons for
maintaining confidence in your original belief, even if they admit that some
adjustment is sometimes rationally required.2
A doxastic disagreement with someone, especially with someone you take to be
your epistemic peer, also confronts you with a slightly different question. This
question, call it the epistemic trust question, is: how much should you trust our own
epistemic faculties relative to the epistemic faculties of others? While the epistemic
trust question has not received quite as much attention in the debate on the
epistemology of disagreement as the rational response question, answering the
former is important for the epistemology of disagreement because it sheds light on
the latter.
To illustrate, suppose it turns out that, at least prima facie, you should not trust
your own epistemic faculties more than those of others, and perhaps even that you
should trust the epistemic faculties of others as much as you trust your own. Call
this type of answers to the epistemic trust question the Symmetry View. If the
Symmetry View is correct, it is less likely that ignoring the fact of a doxastic
disagreement with someone else and remaining steadfast will be the rational
response. The Symmetry View may thus lend support to Conformist intuitions.
Vice versa, suppose it turns out that, again at least prima facie, you should trust
your own epistemic faculties more than those of others. Call this answer to the
epistemic trust question the Asymmetry View. The Asymmetry View can lend
support to Non-conformist intuitions. Indeed, a number of recent contributions to
the literature on the epistemology of disagreements have made use of some version
of the Asymmetry View to explain why it is rational to retain confidence in your
original belief when you face a doxastic disagreement with someone else.
They have argued either that the view implies that it is less rational for you to
consider others as peers than is generally assumed (Schafer 2015) or, when you are
facing a doxastic disagreement with a peer, that it explains why there are less
pressures to conciliate than Conformists claim (Wedgwood 2007, 2010; Enoch
2010; Pasnau 2015).
My aim in this paper is to argue against the Asymmetry View and thus to
undermine the support for steadfastness that it provides. My argument will focus on
trust in one’s own epistemic faculties and the question of what justifies such
epistemic self-trust. Epistemic self-trust is the three-place relation that obtains
between a person, her epistemic faculties—faculties related to rational inquiry—and
truth. It is the positive attitude that we take to relying on our epistemic faculties to
get truth when forming and evaluating our beliefs. I will defend an understanding of
epistemic self-trust that involves a leap of epistemic faith (Foley 2001: 173) against
one that generates its own epistemic justification. I will also show that while
1 E.g. Feldman (2006, 2007), Christensen (2007, 2011), Elga (2007, 2010).
2 E.g. Rosen (2001), Kelly (2010), Wedgwood (2007). For further contributions to the debate on the
epistemology of disagreement, see also Feldman and Warfield (2010) and Christensen and Lackey (2013).
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epistemic self-trust is often justified on non-epistemic grounds, this justification
only obtains as long as there are no epistemic reasons to believe that we may have
trusted our epistemic faculties too much. Based on this understanding of epistemic
self-trust, I will argue that doxastic disagreements with others, especially with
epistemic peers, are one important source of epistemic reasons that should lead us to
reconsider the epistemic trust we place in ourselves and, therefore, the beliefs we
have formed by relying on our epistemic faculties.
2 The Epistemic Asymmetry View and Steadfastness
I will consider three main lines of argument in support of steadfast intuitions that
build on the Asymmetry View. The first two, to be introduced in this section, rely on
an epistemic version of the Asymmetry View. The Epistemic Asymmetry View
holds that it is generally epistemically rational to trust one’s own epistemic faculties
more than those of others. Stated more precisely, the Epistemic Asymmetry View
holds the following:
Epistemic Asymmetry View: absent specific epistemic reasons to believe that
others are more reliable than you, it is epistemically rational to trust your own
epistemic faculties more than those of others.
When there are specific epistemic reasons to trust the epistemic faculties of others
more than your own, you should respond to those reasons and lower confidence in
your original beliefs or even defer to the opinions of others. The scope of the
Epistemic Asymmetry View is restricted to cases where there are no reasons to
believe that others are more reliable than you. In those circumstances, it claims, it is
epistemically rational to trust your own epistemic faculties more than those of
others.
The Epistemic Asymmetry View can lend support to Conformist intuitions in two
ways. A first argumentative strategy in support of steadfastness deploys the
Epistemic Asymmetry View to argue that when you face a doxastic disagreement
with an epistemic peer, it is epistemically rational for you to give more weight to
your own belief. Ralph Wedgwood (2007, 2010) has developed an argument of this
sort. His argument focuses on the case of moral disagreements, but it does not hinge
on the distinctiveness of the moral case. He writes (2010: 244):
It seems plausible that there is a sort of rational asymmetry between one’s own
moral intuitions and the intuitions of other people: it is rational to have a
special sort of ‘fundamental trust’ in one’s own intuitions, but it is not even
possible to have the same sort of ‘trust’ in the intuitions of others.
On Wedgwood’s view epistemic self-trust is epistemically basic in a way that
trusting the epistemic faculties of others is not. While you rely directly on your own
epistemic faculties in forming beliefs, you cannot form a belief by relying directly
on the epistemic faculties of others. There is thus an asymmetry between epistemic
self-trust and trust in the epistemic faculties of others that makes it epistemically
rational to trust your own epistemic faculties more than those of others. In a doxastic
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disagreement with a peer, this asymmetry supports giving more weight to your own
belief.
David Enoch (2010), similarly, takes the basicness of epistemic self-trust to
justify giving more weight to your own beliefs in disagreements with an epistemic
peer, but his argumentative strategy is slightly different from Wedgwood’s. The
starting-point of Enoch’s argument is the claim that your own perspective is
inelminable from an assessment of how reliable others are. As he puts it: you cannot
rationally treat yourself merely as one ‘‘truthometer’’ among many.3 This
asymmetry in the relation between you and your own epistemic faculties and those
of others has implications for how you should respond to a disagreement with an
epistemic peer. Enoch argues, against the Conformist, that the disagreement itself is
a reason to downgrade the reliability of someone you thought you had reason to take
to be your peer; it is not a reason to reduce confidence in your own belief. And this
is so, not because you are entitled to give extra weight to your belief because it is
yours, but because trust in your own epistemic faculties entitles you to take your
belief as true and to take the disagreement itself as evidence that you should trust the
other person less.4
Building on this last thought, the Epistemic Asymmetry View can also be
deployed in a second type of argument in defence of steadfast intuitions. It can be
used to argue that the normal case is one where we should regard others as less
reliable than ourselves and, therefore, not as our epistemic peers. The point here is
not so much to present a challenge to the Conformist view of how you are rationally
required to respond when facing a doxastic disagreement with an epistemic peer.
Instead, the point is to support Non-conformist intuitions by arguing that genuine
peer disagreements, situations in which we may have epistemic reason to conciliate
with each other, are much more rare than is commonly thought.
Karl Schafer (2015) pursues this strategy.5 He starts by noting that we may have
all sort of epistemic reasons to treat others as either more or less reliable than
ourselves. When we have reasons to believe that the other is more reliable, for
example, then epistemic rationality requires that we defer to her views. Disregarding
such special epistemic reasons to regard others as either more or less reliable than
ourselves, however, there is the question of how reliable we should consider
ourselves compared to others—I have called this the epistemic trust question.
Schafer argues that, absent special reasons to believe otherwise, we should consider
ourselves more reliable than others.
Schafer’s argument also starts from the basicness of epistemic self-trust. We rely
on our epistemic faculties in forming our beliefs and we rely on them even when we
consider the reliability of others. Schafer interprets the basicness of epistemic self-
trust to imply an entitlement: we are entitled to rely on our epistemic faculties in
forming our beliefs and we make use of this entitlement when we consider the
3 As Enoch (2010: 962) writes: ‘‘You cannot treat yourself as just one truthometer among many, because
even if you decide to do so, it will be very much you—the full, not merely the one-truthometer-among-
many, you—who so decides’’.
4 To be clear, your reason for believing p is not that you believe that p, but that p—your epistemic
faculties, on which you are entitled to rely, suggest to you that p obtains..
5 See also Pasnau (2014) for a discussion of this strategy.
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reliability of others.6 Schafer argues that this entitlement implies that, absent special
reasons for a belief about how reliable others are, how much others agree with us
becomes the main evidence for how reliable they are: if they agree with us, this is
evidence that we should trust their epistemic faculties as much as our own and if
they disagree with us, this is evidence that we should trust their epistemic faculties
less. This also implies, however, that unless we have special epistemic reasons to
think that others are more reliable than us, we should normally regard others as less
reliable than ourselves and give less weight to their beliefs than to our own. That is
the Epistemic Asymmetry View and in Schafer’s argument, as in Enoch’s, this view
is a consequence of the evidential situation that you find yourself in when assessing
the reliability of others that is created by the basicness, or ineliminability, of
epistemic self-trust. But whereas Enoch deploys the Epistemic Asymmetry View to
make a point about disagreements with epistemic peers, Schafer argues that this
asymmetry makes it epistemically rational not to think of others as our epistemic
peers unless we have special reasons to do so.7
3 Against the Epistemic Asymmetry View
There is a problem with both ways of deploying the Epistemic Asymmetry View to
defend steadfast intuitions, however. The problem arises from the Epistemic
Asymmetry View itself, or, to be more precise, from the way in which the fact that
epistemic self-trust is basic is thought to support the Epistemic Asymmetry View
and steadfast intuitions.
I take it to be uncontroversial that epistemic self-trust is basic in a way that trust
in the epistemic faculties of others is not. Without trust in our faculties, we would
not hold many of the beliefs that we do hold. And while we might consider the
opinion of others when we form our beliefs, in doing so, we will still rely on our
own epistemic faculties. Trust in our own epistemic faculties is thus basic for the
formation and evaluation of many of our beliefs in a way that our epistemic trust in
others is not. This shows that there is an asymmetry in how epistemic self-trust and
trust in the epistemic faculties of others are grounded—trust in our own epistemic
faculties is basic, while trust in the epistemic faculties of others is derivative.
We should not conflate this asymmetry in grounding with asymmetry in rational
trust in our own epistemic faculties relative to those of others, however, and not
assume that the basicness of epistemic self-trust directly supports the Epistemic
Asymmetry View, therefore. The grounding claim is, in the first instance, a
descriptive claim—it is a claim about how epistemic self-trust is involved in how
we form many of our beliefs and in how we come to trust the epistemic faculties of
others. The Epistemic Asymmetry View, by contrast, makes a normative claim—a
claim about the epistemic rationality of trusting our own epistemic faculties more
6 Schafer captures the thought in two tenets, called ‘Self-Trust’ and ‘Testimonial Entitlement’—see
Schafer (2015: 27).
7 As Schafer puts it: ‘‘[p]rovided one has no special reason to treat oneself as less (or more) reliable than
other people, one should give somewhat more weight to one’s own opinions than one does to the opinions
of other’’ (Shafer 205: 38).
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than those of others. Even if we accept that we rely on our epistemic faculties all the
time and that the way in which we rely on our epistemic faculties is more basic than
the way in which we rely on the epistemic faculties of others, we need not accept the
claim that it is epistemically rational to trust our own epistemic faculties more than
those of others without further argument.8
It might be thought that the indirect argument in defense of the Epistemic
Asymmetry View that both Enoch and Schafer offer is of the right kind. They argue
that the asymmetry in grounding has implications for the evidence that you have for
how reliable others are. While the basicness of epistemic self-trust gives rise to an
entitlement to treat your epistemic faculties as reliable, how much you trust the
epistemic faculties of others depends on the evidence you have for their reliability.
Absent specific epistemic reasons to believe that others are either more or less
reliable than you, how much others agree or disagree with you is the only evidence
you have for their reliability. If they agree with you, this is evidence that they might
be equally reliable as you. And if they disagree with you, this is evidence that they
are less reliable than you are. This sort of argument would, if successful, offer
support for the Epistemic Asymmetry View—for the claim that, absent specific
epistemic reasons to believe that others are more reliable than you are, it is
epistemically rational to trust your own epistemic faculties more than those of
others, especially of those who disagree with you.9
But the argument is not successful. The problem concerns the normative
significance of the basicness of epistemic self-trust. Earlier, I have argued that we
should not conflate the descriptive grounding claim and the normative claim that is
at the core of the Epistemic Asymmetry View. It is true, however, that the basicness
of epistemic self-trust supports certain normative claims. I do not want to deny that
the basicness of epistemic self-trust is of normative significance. But the normative
significance of the basicness of epistemic self-trust does not support the Epistemic
Asymmetry View.
The normative significance of the basicness of self-trust is a case of ‘ought
implies can’. The requirements of epistemic rationality cannot imply that the way
we generally form our beliefs is epistemically impermissible. We rely on our
epistemic faculties in forming most of our beliefs, and we rely on them even without
a positive epistemic reason to believe that they are reliable. Restricting the
permissible reliance on our epistemic faculties to cases where we have reason to
believe that they are reliable would make most of our belief formation impossible
and this undermines the plausibility of such a requirement. We should thus not
expect the rationality of epistemic self-trust to depend on the presence of epistemic
8 Note that some philosophers who accept that epistemic self-trust is basic in the grounding sense also
accept some form of Epistemic Symmetry View, i.e. the view that it is rational to trust the epistemic
faculties of others to the same degree as you trust your own. Versions of this type of Symmetry View can
be found in Foley (2001) and Zagzebski (2012), for example.
9 This argument relies on what I call an epistemic view of epistemic self-trust, according to which
epistemic self-trust involves a belief that our epistemic faculties are reliable, or at least more reliable than
those of others. In the last section of this paper, after considering an alternative way to deploy the
Asymmetry View in support of steadfast intuitions, I will defend a view of epistemic self-trust, which I
call the practical view. The practical view will allow us to see more fully what is wrong with the
epistemic view and with the argument for the Epistemic Asymmetry View it supports..
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reasons that show that our epistemic faculties are reliable. Vice versa, epistemic
self-trust must generally be epistemically rational even in the absence of positive
epistemic reasons to believe that our epistemic faculties are reliable.10
It is thus true that the basicness of epistemic self-trust has some normative
implications. But the ‘ought implies can’ argument only shows that we are entitled
to trust our epistemic faculties even in the absence of epistemic reasons to believe
that our faculties are reliable. It does not show that there is an epistemic reason to
believe that our epistemic faculties are reliable and that suspending belief about the
reliability of your epistemic faculties would be epistemically irrational. The
entitlement to trust your epistemic faculties—grounded in their basicness—thus
does not entail an entitlement to believe that your epistemic faculties are reliable.11
Given that the entitlement to rely on our epistemic faculties does not entail an
entitlement to believe that our epistemic faculties are reliable, the rest of the
argument in support of the Epistemic Asymmetry View, and thus of steadfast
intuitions, is also in trouble. If the basicness of epistemic self-trust does not imply an
epistemic reason to believe that our epistemic faculties are reliable, it also cannot
support the comparative claim that is at the heart of the Epistemic Asymmetry
View—that we are entitled to trust our own epistemic faculties more than those of
others, at least as long as there are no specific epistemic reasons for believing that
others are more reliable than us.
What would support the comparative claim is the following thought. If we are
entitled to believe that our epistemic faculties are reliable, then the reliability of our
beliefs gives us reason to treat our beliefs as true (or likely to be true) and to
measure the reliability of others on the basis of how much they agree with us. It is
reasoning along those lines that justifies discounting the beliefs of those who
disagree with us. If the entitlement to rely on our epistemic faculties does not entail
an entitlement to believe that our faculties are reliable, by contrast, then it is not true
that the question of how much we should trust the epistemic faculties of others
reduces to how much they agree or disagree with us. Instead, we also need to
consider the possibility that a disagreement is the result of us trusting our own
epistemic faculties too much.
The point can be illustrated with the help of Schafer’s list example. Schafer
draws an analogy between the problem of how much you should trust the epistemic
faculties of others and the following thought experiment (Schafer 2015: 31f):
Suppose I have a list of 100 yes/no questions and answers to each. And
suppose that I know that each of these answers is 95% likely to be correct.
Now suppose I am given a second list with the same 100 questions and
answers to each, where these answers agree with the answers in the original
list in the first 95 instances and disagree with them in the remaining 5.
Schafer argues that given no prior information about the reliability of the second
list, the only evidence you have for assessing the reliability of the second list is how
much the answers on the second list agree with the answers on the first list. And
10 See Foley (2001) for an argument along those lines and Fricker (2014: 178).
11 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for helping me clarify this point.
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while each question on which the two lists agree is evidence that the second list is as
reliable as the first (95%), disagreement is evidence that the second list is less
reliable. Given that there is less than full agreement, Schafer argues, you should thus
conclude that the second list is less reliable than the first.
This argument fails to engage with the possibility that the second list is 100%
reliable. And given that the reliability of the first list is only 95%, we should at least
consider whether the disagreement between the two lists is best explained as a result
of the limited reliability of the first list, not as a result of the greater error-proneness
of the second list. To see the point more clearly, consider the case where you take
the reliability of the first list to be only 80%. As this implies that you should expect
the first list to yield the wrong answer for 20% of the questions, when you notice a
disagreement between the two lists, you should at least consider the possibility that
the second list is more reliable than the first.12
My point is that your agreement-based evidence that the second list is less
reliable than the first list might be misleading and the potential for it to be
misleading is greater the less reliable the first list is. Limiting yourself to agreement-
based evidence only makes sense if you have good reasons to take the first list’s
answers to the questions to be true or likely to be true. If the possibility that the first
list’s answers may be wrong is taken into account, limiting yourself to agreement-
based evidence is, at best, incomplete.
In the epistemic self-trust case, what you should believe about the reliability of
your own epistemic faculties is, as I have argued, an open question. And without an
entitlement to believe that our epistemic faculties are reliable, this sort of defense of
the Epistemic Asymmetry View collapses and so do arguments in support of
steadfast intuitions that build on this view.13 I will further flesh out this point in the
last section. But before getting to that, it will be useful to consider an alternative
way in which the Asymmetry View might be deployed in support of Non-
conformist intuitions first. This alternative way rests on a non-epistemic version of
the Asymmetry View.
4 The Non-Epistemic Asymmetry View and Steadfastness
The alternative argument aims to show that although it may be epistemically
rational to conciliate in a disagreement with an epistemic peer, there are other, non-
epistemic reasons for trusting your epistemic faculties more than those of others and
for remaining steadfast in a disagreement with a peer. The non-epistemic version of
the Asymmetry View on which this argument relies may be characterized as
follows:
12 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for providing this example.
13 To be fair, Schafer recognizes this objection. He admits that if we cannot assume that we are more
reliable than others, then his argument fails: ‘‘Is the basic level of confidence that we are entitled to have
in others as high as the basic level of confidence we are entitled to have in ourselves? If the answer to this
question is yes, then the argument I have been sketching collapses’’ (2015: 39).
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Non-Epistemic Asymmetry View: there are non-epistemic reasons that make
it rational to trust your own epistemic faculties more than those of others.
Robert Pasnau (2015) pursues this strategy in support of Non-conformist
intuitions. Like Schafer, he does not question the Conformist’s claim that a
disagreement with a peer gives you an epistemic reason to adjust your belief. Pasnau
accepts that there are no epistemic reasons to trust your own epistemic faculties
more in these circumstances. Instead of arguing against Conformism directly,
Pasnau argues that trust in one’s epistemic faculties may legitimately pull one in the
opposing direction: while there are epistemic reasons to conciliate, there are other,
non-epistemic, reasons grounded in epistemic self-trust that support remaining
steadfast.
Pasnau understands epistemic self-trust as a doxastic value. Epistemic self-trust,
as already discussed, plays an essential role in our belief formation—we come to
hold most of our beliefs in virtue of trusting our epistemic faculties and there is
value in that. This is not to say, however, that trust in your epistemic faculties gives
you an epistemic reason for the beliefs you have formed in virtue of that trust.
Instead, we should recognize that honoring the value of epistemic self-trust gives
you a different type of reason for sticking to your guns.
Understanding epistemic self-trust as a doxastic value has implications for how
you should respond to a disagreement with an epistemic peer. Pasnau distinguishes
between a strong and a weak hypothesis about the significance of the doxastic value
of epistemic self-trust in this regard. The strong hypothesis is that self-trust requires
giving more weight to one’s own belief than to the belief of one’s peer. The weak
hypothesis is that self-trust merely licenses giving more weight to one’s own belief.
Pasnau aims to defend the latter (2015: 2323):
[T]he doxastic value of self-trust has sufficient weight to make it the case that
it would not be wrong, at least in some cases of peer disagreement, to give
significantly less weight to the views of one’s epistemic peer.
On Pasnau’s view, while there may be epistemic reasons to give considerable
weight to the belief of the peer you disagree with, there is a trust-related reason to
give more weight to your own belief in cases of peer disagreements. In the context
of epistemic peer disagreements, Pasnau argues that the normative significance of
self-trust is such that, while not making it epistemically rational to give more weight
to one’s own belief relative to the belief of your peer, all things considered it may
‘‘not be wrong’’ to do so.
I agree with Pasnau that it is promising to understand epistemic self-trust as a
value that sits on the outside of the framework of epistemic rationality. One
advantage of this way of thinking about epistemic self-trust is that it avoids the
problems that I have identified with the Epistemic Asymmetry View. It gives us a
better handle on why accepting that epistemic self-trust is basic and common does
not imply that it gives us an epistemic reason to trust our epistemic faculties more
than those of others.
But the alternative view also gives rise to some questions. What does it mean to
say that one is licensed to give more weight to one’s own belief than to that of one’s
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peer? Pasnau makes it quite clear that he does not just mean that there is an
explanation, based on self-trust, for why one might be inclined to do so. He means
something normative. But as he denies that there is an epistemic reason for trusting
one’s epistemic faculties more than those of others, what sort of reason would that
be? The sense in which it might not be wrong to place more weight on one’s own
belief requires further clarification. In addition, there is the question of whether
understanding epistemic self-trust as a doxastic value can provide resources for
resisting pressures to conciliate in doxastic disagreements with a peer.
5 The Practical View of Epistemic Self-Trust and the Rationality
of Self-Doubt
My aim in this final section of the paper is to both clarify the nature of the reasons
that can justify epistemic self-trust and to argue—against Pasnau—that a doxastic
disagreement with a peer puts pressure on originally justified epistemic self-trust. I
shall develop and defend an account of epistemic self-trust that builds on Pasnau’s
insight that epistemic self-trust may be justified on non-epistemic grounds. As we
will see, however, this account, which I take to be independently plausible, does not
support Pasnau’s non-epistemic version of the Asymmetry View.
I call the account of epistemic self-trust that I will put forward in this section a
practical view. On this view, there are practical reasons that can justify epistemic
self-trust in the absence of epistemic reasons for believing that our epistemic
faculties are reliable. Because the practical view does not involve a belief in the
reliability of our epistemic faculties, it contrasts with what we may call the
epistemic view of epistemic self-trust. According to the latter, epistemic self-trust
involves a belief that our epistemic faculties are reliable, or at least more reliable
than those of others.
I will argue that the practical view implies that the justification for epistemic self-
trust is undermined when there are epistemic reasons to believe that our epistemic
faculties have not been reliable. This account of epistemic self-trust and its
justification will allow me to show that epistemic self-trust does not license us, on
non-epistemic grounds, to remain steadfast in a doxastic disagreement with an
epistemic peer and to explain why epistemic self-trust tends to come under pressure
in such disagreements.
In developing the practical view of epistemic self-trust, it will be helpful to
consider trust in general, first. I take trust in general to be a three-place relation—as
an attitude that we take towards someone, perhaps oneself, in some respect. When
we trust a person in some respect, we rely on her to do what we have trusted her to
do and take a positive stance towards that reliance.14 On an increasingly common
view, one that I adopt here, this positive stance need not involve a belief that the
person will do what we have trusted her to do (Holton 1994; Faulkner 2007, 2011;
14 I follow Holton (1994) here, who distinguishes between relying on something happening and relying
on someone doing something. Trust relates to the latter, but not the former. See Baier (1986) for a
different view and see Simpson (2012) and Frost-Arnold (2014) on difficulties with defining trust.
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McGeer 2008; Marusˇic´ 2015). There is a difference between relying on someone in
the sense that one expects—predicts—them to do something and relying on
someone in the trust-sense. While the former involves a belief, the latter type of
reliance need not involve a belief. I can trust you to phi, say to remember our
agreement, without believing that you will phi. Trust, on this understanding, is thus
a practical stance. As Holton (1994: 67) describes this understanding of trust:
Trusting someone does not involve relying on them and having some belief
about them: a belief, perhaps, that they are trustworthy. What it involves is
relying on them to do something, and investing that reliance with a certain
attitude. This is to take a practical stance.
Some draw a sharp distinction between trusting someone to phi and believing
that someone will phi. Berislav Marusˇic´ (2015: 180), for example, argues that we
misrepresent the phenomenon of trusting someone to phi if we interpret it as
entailing a belief that the person will phi. On this view, when we have a belief that a
person will phi, trust is not involved. This may be too strong a claim, but I cannot
pursue this here.15 My argument will only rely on the weaker claim that trust does
not entail, or typically involve, a belief, allowing that sometimes when we rely on
someone in the trust-sense we also hold a belief that they are reliable.
Epistemic self-trust, similarly, is a practical stance, or so I want to claim. It need
not involve a belief that our epistemic faculties are reliable. Instead, it is better seen
as the (epistemically) ‘‘ungrounded reliance on our epistemic faculties’’ (Fricker
2015) and the positive attitude that we take towards this reliance. The positive
attitude that we take towards this reliance plays a role not only in doxastic
contexts—when we form and evaluate our beliefs—but also in practical contexts—
when we act on the basis of those beliefs.16
I argued earlier that the basicness of epistemic self-trust entails an entitlement to
take our epistemic faculties as reliable, even in the absence of positive epistemic
reasons for belief that they are reliable. The practical view that I am developing here
helps us see more clearly why the entitlement to rely on our epistemic faculties
should not be equated with an entitlement to believe that our epistemic faculties are
reliable. Instead, we are entitled to rely on our epistemic faculties even if doing so
involves an epistemic leap of faith (Foley 2001: 173).
At first, the idea of epistemic self-trust as a practical stance may seem puzzling. If
epistemic self-trust is a positive attitude that we take towards the reliability of our
epistemic faculties to get truth, then, surely, it must be possible to epistemically
evaluate this attitude? That is correct, but it does not imply that epistemic self-trust
is an epistemic attitude, not a practical stance, or that epistemic self-trust
necessarily, or even typically, involves a belief that our faculties are reliable. We
may rely on our epistemic faculties in the trust sense without having given much
15 See Zagzebski (2012: 42) and Fricker (2015) for discussions of this point.
16 See also McGeer (2008) on how trust relates to hope.
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thought to their reliability. And we often trust our epistemic faculties even though
we are aware, or could become aware, that we do not have sufficient epistemic
reasons to believe that our epistemic faculties are reliable.17
Understanding epistemic self-trust as a practical stance does not preclude the
epistemic evaluation of epistemic self-trust, however. That is because epistemic
self-trust should be interpreted as an epistemically focused attitude (Cassam
in press). Like other epistemically focused attitudes—think of intellectual diligence,
for example—epistemic self-trust is an attitude that we take towards epistemic goals
such as knowledge and epistemic procedures such as rational inquiry. And insofar as
trusting our epistemic faculties to get us the truth amounts to taking a positive stance
towards epistemic goals such as knowledge and epistemic procedures such as
rational inquiry, it is possible, and indeed appropriate, to ask whether our epistemic
self-trust is conducive to reaching knowledge and engaging in rational inquiry or
not. As an epistemically focused attitude, epistemic self-trust is thus subject to
epistemic evaluation.
This understanding of epistemic self-trust as a practical stance that is subject to
epistemic evaluation has the following implications for the justification of epistemic
self-trust.18 First, epistemic reasons limit justified epistemic self-trust: epistemic
self-trust is not justified when there are epistemic reasons to believe that our reliance
on our epistemic faculties is epistemically unwarranted. As already argued above,
justified epistemic self-trust must be possible in the absence of epistemic reasons to
believe that our epistemic faculties are reliable, but this does not entail that such
trust is justified on epistemic grounds. Epistemic self-trust does not generate its own
epistemic justification and justified epistemic self-trust is subject to epistemic
constraints.
The point is important, not least, because empirical evidence shows that we tend
to trust our epistemic faculties more than we should, i.e. even in cases where there
are epistemic reasons that suggest that our epistemic faculties are not reliable.19 Our
tendency to trust our epistemic faculties, while doxastically and practically valuable
in the absence of epistemic reasons that show that our epistemic faculties are not
reliable, can thus come into conflict with the demands of epistemic rationality.
When we become aware of evidence that suggests that we may have trusted our
epistemic faculties too much, we should reconsider the belief in question—we
should reduce our confidence in this belief or perhaps even suspend belief. In these
cases, epistemic self-doubt becomes epistemically rational. So, while it is
epistemically permissible to trust our epistemic faculties in the absence of good
17 Some have linked epistemic self-trust to the problem of epistemic circularity (Foley 2001; Alston
2005; Zagzebski 2012). The problem—if it exists (see Van Cleve 1979, for example)—is that there is no
non-circular way to establish that there is a connection between our epistemic faculties and successfully
getting the truth. Because of this circularity, it is not possible to rationally discover such a connection. We
can, and often do, however, trust our epistemic faculties to get us the truth. But we cannot show that we
have ordinary epistemic reasons to believe that this reliance is justified. I am grateful to Quassim Cassam
for helping me clarify this point.
18 The view shares some similarities with the view defended by Wright (2004).
19 See Kahneman (2011), for example; see also Ahlstrom-Vij (2013) for a discussion of the
epistemological implications of the empirical results.
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evidence that they are reliable, we cannot permissibly rely on our epistemic faculties
‘‘against the evidence’’.20
When we have no epistemic reasons to believe that our epistemic faculties are
unreliable, however, then trust in our epistemic faculties may be justified on non-
epistemic grounds and this is the second dimension of justified epistemic self-trust. I
want to claim that both doxastic and practical considerations are relevant for the
justification of epistemic self-trust in those circumstances. We rely on our epistemic
faculties not just when we form and evaluate beliefs for the sake of figuring out
what to believe, but also when we try to figure out how to act. The doxastic value of
epistemic self-trust is thus not limited to its role in role in forming and evaluating
beliefs. The doxastic value of epistemic self-trust also, and importantly, relates to its
role in rational action. At least if the cognitive model of action is true, rational
action is not possible without a connection between our actions and our beliefs.
Forming beliefs about our practical context, evaluating those beliefs, and settling
our beliefs in light of possible conflicts are all important for being able to act in
rational fashion. Epistemic self-trust is one factor among others that enables us to be
practically rational and to respond to practical reasons.
To be sure, practical considerations cannot justify epistemic self-trust in
circumstances where epistemic self-trust is epistemically unwarranted. Since
epistemic self-trust is the reliance on our epistemic faculties to get truth, practical
considerations cannot trump epistemic reasons we have for believing that our
epistemic faculties have malfunctioned. If there were allowed to trump epistemic
considerations, the very essence of epistemic self-trust would be lost. Practical
reasons can thus only provide a justification for epistemically permissible self-trust.
If there are no epistemic reasons that render epistemic self-trust impermissible, then
practical reasons can justify our epistemically ungrounded reliance on our epistemic
faculties. Trust in our epistemic faculties is warranted when it is an appropriate
practical response to the fact that there are insufficient reasons to believe that our
faculties are reliable, but not when we have epistemic reasons to believe that our
faculties are unreliable.21
This practical view of epistemic self-trust puts us in a position to evaluate
Pasnau’s claim that epistemic self-trust is a doxastic value that licenses non-
conciliation in a disagreement with an epistemic peer. First, with regard to the
doxastic value of epistemic self-trust, Pasnau is right to claim that our trust in our
epistemic faculties gives rise to a whole range of beliefs and that there is value in
that. I have argued that this value is primarily practical, as trusting our epistemic
faculties even in the absence of reasons for believing that our faculties are reliable
can help us be good practical agents.
But I have also argued that such epistemic self-trust is only conditionally
justified. When there is no evidence that we have trusted our epistemic faculties too
much, epistemic self-trust has doxastic value—both in relation to belief formation
as such and in relation to rational action based on such beliefs. When we have
20 I borrow this phrase from Marusˇic´ (2015) who argues that it is possible to trust other people against the
evidence. I am rejecting this here for epistemic self-trust.
21 Frost-Arnold (2014) calls trust of this kind ‘‘coping trust’’.
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evidence that shows that we have trusted ourselves too much, however, then
epistemic rationality requires that we reduce confidence in the belief in question or
perhaps suspend belief altogether. Practical considerations can supplement
epistemic considerations in the justification of epistemic self-trust, but the former
cannot trump the latter without undermining the aim of getting truth that is
constitutive for epistemic self-trust.
Pasnau’s claim about the doxastic value of epistemic self-trust can thus only
partially be supported: it is true that epistemic self-trust can license us to hold
beliefs in the absence of epistemic reasons to believe that our epistemic faculties are
reliable, but it is not true that it ‘‘would not be wrong’’ to trust our epistemic
faculties against the evidence. The practical view of epistemic self-trust, and the
two-step approach to the justification of epistemic self-trust that it supports, explain
why non-epistemic considerations cannot encroach on epistemic considerations. It is
true that the rationality of epistemic self-trust does not just depend on epistemic
considerations; doxastic and practical considerations matter as well. But if the
doxastic value of epistemic self-trust were allowed to silence epistemic consider-
ations, the essence of epistemic self-trust would be lost.
In addition, and importantly given the main topic of this paper, the practical view
of epistemic self-trust also allows us to see why the doxastic value of epistemic self-
trust does not license you to remain steadfast in a doxastic disagreement with a peer.
An epistemic peer is someone who has access to the same evidence as you do and
who you expect to be equally reliable. You do not have to know or have good
epistemic reasons to believe that the other is equally reliable as you. You are in a
doxastic disagreement with an epistemic peer if you lack good epistemic reason to
think that you are more reliable than the person who disagrees with you—my
argument against the Epistemic Asymmetry View above suggests that we should not
take this to be a rare occurrence.
While there are good non-epistemic reasons to trust your epistemic faculties,
these reasons do not justify trusting your epistemic faculties when there are
epistemic reasons that suggest that your epistemic faculties may not be reliable—
that you have trusted your epistemic faculties too much. A doxastic disagreement
with an epistemic peer, however, is precisely the sort of situation that can give you
an epistemic reason to reconsider your original belief.22 Such a disagreement is thus
the kind of case in which your originally justified epistemic self-trust can come
under pressure.
Let me explain this further. As we saw, trusting your epistemic faculties involves
a leap of epistemic faith. All sorts of input from the world can, and should, lead you
to question the extent to which you trust your epistemic faculties and the beliefs that
you formed on that basis. For example, you may have trusted your epistemic
faculties in forming a belief about the comparative performance of several
applicants for a job. You then remember reading about the effects of implicit bias in
22 While not everyone might agree with this claim, Pasnau, along with many others, accepts that a
doxastic disagreement with an epistemic peer can give you an epistemic reason to adjust your original
belief, as mentioned above. Philosophers sometimes support the claim with the argument that a
disagreement with an epistemic peer provides you with a defeater of your original belief (see e.g. Lackey
2010; Goldberg 2015).
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hiring. This gives you reason to pause and to ask yourself whether you should trust
the process through which you formed your beliefs about the merits of the different
candidates and, on that basis, whether you have reason to revise your original belief.
A doxastic disagreement with a peer, similarly, is one such input from the world
that raises the question of whether you have leapt too far. In the hiring example,
suppose that you communicate your final ranking of the candidates to the other
panelists. You then learn that in the ranking of another panelist—one that you
generally take to be your epistemic peer in these situations—the candidate that you
have ranked last comes out first. This, similarly, gives you reason to pause and to
ask yourself whether you should trust the process through which you formed your
beliefs about the merits of the different candidates. You had assumed, trusting your
epistemic faculties, that your ranking was the one that was warranted by the
available evidence about the candidates. You now realize that someone you
consider to be equally reliable in evaluating the evidence has ranked one of the
candidates very differently. Whose epistemic faculties have malfunctioned? Could
it have been yours? Both scenarios confront you with the possibility that you might
have trusted your epistemic faculties too much in forming your original beliefs.
Admittedly, not all doxastic disagreements with a peer raise the question of
whether you have leapt too far with the same urgency. Suppose your disagreement
with your peer concerns partial belief and the evidence supports both credences. In a
case like this, the doxastic disagreement will exert less pressure on your original
belief than in a case where the disagreement concerns full belief (you believe p and
your peer believes not-p) and the evidence supports only one belief. So, not all
doxastic disagreements with a peer will necessarily have the effect of undermining
your justification for epistemic self-trust. But there will be at least some cases in
which the fact that you and your epistemic peer disagree gives you reason to think
that (at least) one of you has leapt too far. In those cases, the fact that an epistemic
peer disagrees with you gives you an epistemic reason to reconsider the trust you
placed in yourself in forming this belief and to adjust your original belief. Pace
Pasnau (2015), epistemic self-trust does not license you to remain steadfast in those
cases; it is what comes under pressure in at least some disagreements with an
epistemic peer.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I have explored the significance of epistemic self-trust for the
epistemology of disagreement. My main aim has been to argue against attempts to
defend steadfast intuitions on the basis of an asymmetry in how much you are
entitled to trust your own epistemic faculties compared to those of others. Focusing,
first, on epistemic versions of the Asymmetry View, I have shown that while it is
true that epistemic self-trust is basic in a way that trust in the epistemic faculties of
others is not, this does not have the asymmetric normative implications that would
be needed to defend steadfast intuitions. I then discussed Pasnau’s non-epistemic
version of the Asymmetry View and argued that although Pasnau is right to draw
our attention to the doxastic value of epistemic self-trust, he is wrong to claim that
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non-epistemic considerations can legitimately encroach on epistemic rationality
and, in this way, support steadfast intuitions in the case of a doxastic disagreement
with an epistemic peer. Such disagreements tend to give you epistemic reasons to
doubt the reliability of your epistemic faculties.
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